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CaseNo.20051044-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Robyn Celeste Hopkins, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004), and aggravated 
burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (West 
2004). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to the 
sentences prescribed by the statute? 
Standard of Review. "The decision whether to grant probation is within the 
complete discretion of the trial court." State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048,1049 (Utah 
App. 1991). This Court will not disturb that sentence unless the trial court abused 
that discretion. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The relevant statutory provisions and rules on appeal are set forth in the text 
of the brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Summary of Proceedings. Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery 
and aggravated kidnapping. R. 3-4. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant 
entered guilty pleas to aggravated robbery, as charged, and aggravated burglary 
(amended from aggravated kidnapping). R. 1-2,63-69. The prosecution agreed that 
the weapons enhancement would be dismissed if defendant was sentenced to 
prison. R. 68. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent 
prison terms of five years-to-life. R. 71-72. Defendant timely appealed. R. 80-81. 
The Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to rule 44, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. R. 85. 
Summary of Facts.1 Believing that Dirk George owed her money, defendant 
solicited the help of Steven Dirks to collect the disputed debt. R. 97: 9-10; R. 98: 8, 
11. Dirks agreed and the two drove to George's home. R. 98:11. The two entered 
George's home, Dirks displayed a gun, and they demanded that George give them 
various items of property. R. 97:9,12; R. 98:12. As defendant scavenged George's 
house for property, Dirks threatened George with the gun. R. 97:9-10. Unsatisfied 
1
 The facts are taken from the prosecutor's recitation of the factual basis for 
the guilty plea made at the disposition hearing and from the prosecutor's recitation 
of facts made at sentencing. 
2 
with the property available at George's home, the two ordered George into their car, 
drove to a local convenience store, and demanded that he purchase various items 
for them. R. 97:10. George alerted the store clerk about what was happening and 
the clerk called police. R. 97:10. Defendant and Dirks fled the scene in their car and 
tossed the gun out of the car. R. 97:10. Police apprehended defendant and Dirks 
and recovered the gun. R. 97:10. Defendant and Dirks confessed to police. R. 97: 
10-11. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing her to 
prison(rather than probation. He claims that the trial court abused its discretion by 
failing to consider the sentencing factors set forth in section 76-3-401 and considered 
in State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998). However, a trial court is required to 
consider those factors when considering the imposition of consecutive sentences. It 
is not required to consider them when considering probation. When consecutive 
sentencing is not at issue, the trial court is simply required to consider defendant's 
statement to the court at sentencing and any information presented by defendant in 
mitigation of punishment. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). In any event, the record 
demonstrates that the trial court considered the factors identified in section 76-3-401. 
The trial court simply concluded that the gravity and circumstances of the offense 
were too serious to warrant probation. It is not an abuse of discretion to place more 
emphasis on one factor over another. Accordingly, defendant's claim fails and her 
sentence should be affirmed. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO PRISON RATHER THAN 
IMPOSING PROBATION. 
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her 
probation. Aplt. Brf. at 7-11. Her argument lacks merit. 
A defendant "has no right to be placed on probation/' State v. Smith, 842 P.2d 
908, 910 (Utah 1992). "The decision whether to grant probation is within the 
complete discretion of the trial court." State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048,1049 (Utah 
App. 1991). "[T]he exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the 
personal judgment of the [trial] court." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 
1978). A trial court may place a defendant on probation "'if it thinks that will best 
serve the ends of justice and is compatible with the public interest/" Rhodes, 818 
P.2d at 1051; accord State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, % 23, 82 P.3d 1167. 
In deciding whether probation is appropriate, the court considers "many 
different ingredients," including deterrence, punishment, restitution, incapacitation, 
and rehabilitation. Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1051. The decision to impose or deny 
probation "rests in many cases upon subtleties not apparent on the face of a cold 
record," id., e.g., "intangibles of [a defendant's] character, personality and attitude," 
State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198,310 P.2d 388,393 (1957). 
This Court will not find an abuse of discretion unless the trial judge "act[ed] 
with inherent unfairness in sentencing, impose[d] a clearly excessive sentence, or 
fail[ed] to consider all legally relevant factors." State v. Thomas, 2006 UT App 106U, 
4 
J 6; accord Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, f 23. To prevail on a challenge to a trial 
court's decision not to grant probation, a defendant must "clearly show that the trial 
judge would have granted probation except for some wholly irrelevant, improper or 
inconsequential consideration." An "appellate court can properly find abuse only if 
it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial 
court." Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887. 
Relying on State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), defendant claims that the 
trial court abused its decision in denying probation by failing to consider that: (1) no 
one was injured during the robbery, (2) the convictions constituted defendant's first 
felony convictions, (3) defendant gave a full statement to police and expressed 
sorrow for her actions, and (4) while in jail, defendant participated in drug 
counseling and received her GED. Aplt. Brf. at 8-11. Defendant's claim fails. 
The sentencing factors identified in Galli—"the gravity and circumstances of 
the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs of the defendant"—are set forth in section 76-3-401 of the Utah Code. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (West 2004). That section requires that a trial court 
consider those factors "[i]n determining whether state offenses are to run 
concurrently or consecutively." Id. It does not require a trial court to consider these 
factors when considering probation. Reliance on Galli is thus misplaced.2 Where 
consecutive sentences are not involved, the rules simply require that the court 
"afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any 
Defendant was, in fact, given concurrent sentences. R. 98:13. 
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information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence 
should not be imposed." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) (emphasis added). The record 
demonstrates that the trial court afforded defendant that opportunity. See R. 98. 
In any event, the record belies defendant's claim that the trial court did not 
consider the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of defendant. Before 
sentencing, defense counsel pointed out that the presentence investigation report 
(PSI) erroneously assessed defendant one point for prior juvenile convictions and 
three points for weapons use. R. 98: 2-3. Counsel noted that defendant was thus 
improperly placed on Criminal History Row II (resulting in a prison 
recommendation) rather than Criminal History Row I (which would have resulted 
in a recommendation of intermediate sanctions). R. 98: 2-4. Moreover, counsel 
emphasized that defendant "has no prior felony record at all/' R. 98: 5. Counsel 
also advised the trial court of defendant's rehabilitation needs and efforts: 
She has certainly had some drug problems and that fueled this case, 
and the mere fact that she's been in jail this long I think has contributed 
towards getting her on the road to getting through that stuff. She has 
gotten her GED while she's been in there, gotten some additional 
classes, so she's been productive and she can do that. 
R. 98: 7. The trial court also heard from defendant, who expressed her "sorrow for 
what [she had] done/' R. 98: 7. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, therefore, the trial court did consider that 
defendant's convictions constituted her first felony convictions, that she expressed 
her sorrow for her conduct, and that while in jail, she participated in drug 
counseling and received her GED. Additionally, the trial court reviewed the 
6 
presentence investigation report (PSI), R. 98: 2, which would have also addressed 
defendant's rehabilitative needs-3 The court was also made aware of the factual 
basis for the convictions, and was thus well aware that no one was injured in the 
robbery and that defendant confessed to police after being apprehended. R. 97:9-
11. Finally, the record demonstrates that the court accepted defendant's challenges 
to the PSI and acknowledged that the resulting recommendation would have been 
intermediate sanctions. R. 98:12-13. 
The trial court thus considered all of the factors set forth in section 76-3-401. It 
permitted defendant to present information in mitigation of punishment. It also 
accepted defendant's challenge to the PSI. The court concluded, however, that the 
gravity and circumstances of the offense were "too serious" to justify alternative 
sentencing and sentenced defendant to prison. R. 98: 13. This Court has long 
recognized that a trial court "d[oes] not abuse its discretion by placing more 
emphasis on punishing [a] defendant rather than rehabilitating [her]." State v. 
Nutall, 861 P.2d 454,458 (Utah App. 1993). 
In sum, it cannot be said that "no reasonable [person] would take the view" 
that defendant's conduct warranted prison, rather than probation. See Gerrard, 584 
P.2d at 887. "[T]he sentence given by the court is the sentence prescribed by 
statute." Smith, 842 P.2d at 910. Moreover, the facts supporting defendant's guilty 
Because defendant did not make the PSI a part of the record on appeal, this 
Court will assume the regularity of the proceedings below. See State v. Penman, 964 
P.2d 1157,1162 (Utah App. 1998). 
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pleas also provided a factual basis for aggravated kidnapping, the original charge 
before the plea bargain. See R. 97: 10-12; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(1)(a) (West 
2004).4 A conviction for aggravated kidnapping would have subjected defendant to 
a minimum mandatory sentence of either 6,10, or 15 years-to-life in prison. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(3). The plea bargain avoided a minimum mandatory 
sentence of at least six years. Under these circumstances, the trial court cannot be 
faulted for rejecting alternative sentencing or probation. See State v. Lvpsky, 639 R2d 
174, 176 (Utah 1981) (recognizing that a trial court may consider any offense, 
whether or not a conviction occurred, in imposing a sentence); State v. Howell, 707 
P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) (observing that facts relating to dismissed charges are 
properly considered at sentencing); see also State v. Hines, 663 So.2d 199, 202 (La. 
App. 1996) (observing that a trial court may consider a plea bargain when imposing 
sentence). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions and sentence. 
4
 Defendant, through counsel, admitted that she solicited the help of Steven 
Dirks to collect the alleged debt from Mr. George, that the two ordered Mr. George 
into their car, that they drove to a convenience store, and that the two demanded 
that Mr. George purchase items for them. R. 97:10-11. Defendant did dispute that 
she knew of the gun before they entered Mr. George's home. R. 97:11. However, 
defendant can claim no such ignorance with regard to the gun when they ordered 
Mr. George into their car, drove him to a convenience store, and demanded that he 
purchase items for them. 
8 
Respectfully submitted July 6,2006. 
Mark L. Shurtleff 
Utah Attorney General 
frey S. Gray 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAR 1 6 2006 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Robert Craig Thomas, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20050013-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 1 6 , 2 0 0 6 ) 
2 0 0 6 UT App 106 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 041905292 
The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis 
Attorneys: John P. Pace and Catherine E. Roberts, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Marian Decker, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, McHugh, and Thorne. 
McHUGH, Judge: 
Robert Craig Thomas appeals his sentence of two 
indeterminate prison terms of zero to five years and two jail 
terms of twelve months, all to be served consecutively. Thomas 
pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance, theft by 
deception, attempted unlawful use of a transaction card, and 
attempted forgery. Thomas argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion by (1) failing to order a diagnostic evaluation and 
probation and (2) ordering that the sentences be served 
consecutively rather than concurrently.1 We affirm. 
The record reveals that Thomas's crimes stem from a lengthy 
methamphetamine addiction. The presentence report stated that 
Thomas had been imprisoned several times in the past for drug-
related crimes and had completed several treatment programs. 
The report also stated that Thomas was still using drugs 
1. The State argues that Thomas failed to preserve either of his 
arguments. After reviewing the record, we conclude that both 
issues were sufficiently addressed by the trial court and should 
be resolved on the merits by this court. 
regularly despite receiving treatment. The report recommended 
more prison time. 
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard statements 
from several victims of Thomas's crimes. The court also heard 
from defense counsel, who stated that the prosecution had agreed 
to probation if Thomas could enter an intensive inpatient program 
such as the Odyssey House. The judge noted that although she was 
disinclined to order probation, it would be possible only if 
Thomas first underwent a diagnostic evaluation. The following 
exchange then occurred: 
THE COURT: I111 be frank with you, 
[defense] counsel, and indicate to you that 
I!m doing the diagnostic evaluation because I 
believe in looking at all alternatives, but 
frankly at this point Ifm inclined to send 
him to prison. But we will see how he 
performs in the diagnostic unit, and whatever 
the penalty is going to be it's going to 
involve a significant amount of time behind 
bars. 
You need to be prepared for that. It!s 
not going to be a month or two. And so I'd 
put your best foot forward, sir, at the 
diagnostic center, and if you do treat this 
as a joke, or flippantly, . . . the 
consequences will be real and significant. 
Do you understand me? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Forthwith--and 
we'll set this ninety days hence. I think 
I'm going to ask for a ninety-day diagnostic 
evaluation. 
THE DEFENDANT: Just send me to prison, 
then. 
THE COURT: You'd just like to go to 
prison? 
THE DEFENDANT: Just send me to prison. 
I ain't doing no evaluation. I ain't wasting 
ninety days. 
THE COURT: So why don't you want to do 
it? 
THE DEFENDANT: Because they're going to 
recommend prison automatic. Every--your 
honor, every time I've been in front of 
anybody, I went straight to prison. They 
20050013-CA 
send me to prison. I don't get no chance in 
there. 
I'm a drug addict. I'm sorry for what I 
did to them people. You think I like what I 
do? No, I don't like doing it. I want to go 
to Odyssey House where I can get some help. 
. . . No matter what I say, no matter what I 
do in diagnostic, they're going to send me to 
prison. . . . The board's going to look at 
that ninety days, and they're going to go, 
"So what?" 
The trial court subsequently offered Thomas a chance to 
confer with his attorney, after which the court stated, "Mr. 
Thomas, your attitude has had an impact on me. I'm inclined to 
do what you've asked . . . and that is sentence you to prison." 
Thomas replied, "Okay, your honor. Thank you." The court then 
imposed the maximum sentences allowed by statute and ordered that 
they run consecutively. Thomas later filed a Motion for Relief 
from Judgment, which was denied. 
Thomas asserts the trial court misconstrued his comments as 
exhibiting a poor attitude when in actuality he was merely 
expressing his desire to overcome his drug addiction. He 
contends that the court then retaliated against him for his 
comments by sentencing him to consecutive prison terms rather 
than probation. 
"We review the sentencing decisions of a trial court for 
abuse of discretion." State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996) (quotations and citation omitted). Abuse of 
discretion may be manifest if the judge acts with inherent 
unfairness in sentencing, imposes a clearly excessive sentence, 
or fails to consider all legally relevant factors. See id. "An 
appellate court may only find abuse if it can be said that no 
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial 
court." Id. (alteration in original) (quotations and citation 
omitted). 
Thomas first contends the trial court should have ordered an 
evaluation and probation. "Whether or not the judge elects to 
order an evaluation before passing sentence is clearly within 
[her] discretion, based on [her] own judgment of the case before 
[her]." State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). 
Moreover, the granting of " [p]robation is not a matter of right," 
but involves "considering intangibles of [the defendant's] 
character, personality[,] and attitude, of which the cold record 
gives little inkling." State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 
388, 393 (1957). For this reason, the decision whether to grant 
probation necessarily rests with the trial court. See id,; see 
also State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 730 (Utah 1980) (same); 
State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (same). 
A trial court abuses its discretion if a defendant "clearly 
show[s] that the trial judge would have granted probation except 
for some wholly irrelevant, improper[,] or inconsequential 
consideration." Sibert, 310 P.2d at 393. 
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
ordered prison time rather than a diagnostic evaluation or 
probation. We cannot know from the cold record on appeal, see 
id., the attitude Thomas exhibited to the trial court. 
Furthermore, at the outset, the judge stated that she planned to 
sentence Thomas to significant prison time. She also expressed 
uncertainty as to whether a diagnostic evaluation would 
accomplish anything. We cannot conclude that the trial judge 
would have granted probation absent some wholly improper 
consideration. See id. 
Thomasr s second argument is that the trial court abused its 
discretion by failing to consider all of the necessary factors 
before imposing consecutive sentences. Utah Code section 76-3-
401 states: 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant 
has been adjudged guilty of more than one 
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent 
or consecutive sentences for the 
offenses. . . . 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are 
to run concurrently or consecutively, the 
court shall consider the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses, the number of 
victims, and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1), (2) (2003). "Concurrent sentences 
are favored over consecutive ones." State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 
211,1(43, 52 P.3d 451. 
Thomas argues that because the trial court did not make 
findings on the record regarding the gravity and circumstances of 
his offense, the number of victims, and his history, character, 
and rehabilitative needs, it failed to consider these statutory 
factors and, thus, improperly imposed consecutive sentences. 
This argument is foreclosed by State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, 40 
P.3d 626, in which the Utah Supreme Court, considering a similar 
issue, stated: "[A]s a general rule [we] uphold[] the trial 
20050013-CA A 
court even if it failed to make findings on the record whenever 
it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually made 
such findings." Id. at fll (quotations and citation omitted). 
This assumption should not be made, though, when ,! (1) an 
ambiguity of facts makes the assumption unreasonable, (2) a 
statute explicitly provides that written findings must be made, 
or (3) a prior case states that findings on an issue must be 
made." Id. "Absent these circumstances, we will not assume that 
the trial court's silence, by itself, presupposes that the court 
did not consider the proper factors as required by law." Id. 
Neither case law nor statute requires a trial court to make 
specific findings of fact in a sentencing order. Thus, an 
ambiguity of facts would be the only circumstance in which record 
findings need be made. See id. 
Here, the record supports a conclusion that the trial court 
considered these factors even though it did not make formal 
findings on the record. The presentence report contained 
detailed information about Thomas's criminal history, his past 
attempts at rehabilitation, and the circumstances of the 
offenses. The judge referred to specific parts of the 
presentence report before sentencing and asked counsel for both 
sides whether any changes needed to be made to the report. The 
judge clearly relied on the information in the report in 
determining Thomas's sentence. The court also heard from several 
victims of Thomas's crimes before imposing the sentence. 
Therefore, it is apparent that the trial court considered the 
statutory factors. We see no ambiguity of facts that would have 
necessitated record findings. 
Thomas also asserts that the court ignored the presentence 
report's recommendation of concurrent sentences. However, a 
trial court is not required to follow the recommendations of a 
presentence report. See State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296, 1300 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("The entire sentencing process is a search 
for truth and an evaluation of alternatives. Therefore, the 
recommendations of the prosecutor or any other party are not 
binding upon the court." (citation omitted)). The sentence was 
within the statutory guidelines, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-
203(3), -204 (2003), and, thus, was not clearly unfair or 
excessive. Thomas has provided nothing that would support a 
conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion when it 
sentenced him. 
Affirmed. 
syrte 
CarolynWB. McHugh, Judge/ 
WE CONCUR: 
Juc^tH M. B i l l i n g s , Judge Q 
Will iam A. Thorne J r . , Judge 
S? 
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